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I. INTRODUCTION
Controlling atmospheric pollution which originates beyond national
borders always presents difficult issues. The problems are multiplied when
the source is a merchant vessel, registered under a foreign “flag of
convenience” and operating seaward of state and federal sovereign limits.
Nevertheless, international law provides alternative approaches through
which the coastal sovereign may protect its “onshore” environmental
interests.
The purpose of this paper is to lay out the problems, both factual and
legal, and discuss means by which they may be resolved. California is
used as a case study. The state has long suffered from excessive air
pollution. Congress acknowledged the state’s unique situation when, in
the Clean Air Act, it singled California out for special consideration.1
Of course, much of California’s original air pollution problem arose from
onshore sources, both mobile and stationary. Since the passage of the
Clean Air Act, great strides have been made in reducing harmful emissions
from those sources. But merchant vessels contribute substantially to
onshore pollution, with adverse consequences for both public health and
global warming.2 Until recently, relatively little had been done to cure

1. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A) (2006).
2. See Richard Hildreth & Alison Torbitt, International Treaties and U.S. Laws
as Tools to Regulate the Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships and Ports, 25 INT’L J. OF
MARINE & COASTAL L. 347, 350 (2010) (reporting that “[i]n . . . Santa Barbara, California,
ship emissions are predicted to exceed all land based emissions by 2015.”).
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that defect. The discussion which follows details steps that California
and the federal government have taken in that direction.
II. THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS
A. The Factual Problem
Merchant vessels are universally recognized air polluters. The United
States Commission on Ocean Policy’s findings are telling. It explained
that “[m]ost large commercial ships are powered by marine diesel
engines that use fuels containing high concentrations of contaminates.
These engines have high emissions on a per engine basis and contribute
to high ozone and particulate matter levels in many coastal and port
areas.”3 Corbett and Fischbeck explain that “[s]ince the 1973 fuel crisis,
crude oils have been processed using secondary refining technologies to
extract the maximum quantity of refined products (distillates). [And the
residue of this process typically fuels merchant vessels.] As a consequence,
the concentration of contaminants such as sulfur . . . has increased.”4
They conclude that “[s]hip engines are thus among the world’s highest
polluting combustion sources.”5 And, they say, “[c]argo ships are the
largest polluters, accounting for two-thirds of vessel sulfur emissions.”6
Hildreth and Torbitt reach similar conclusions, reporting that “[m]arine
engines produce emissions at a far higher rate than stationary sources,
due to the lack of stringent pollution requirements and the poor quality
of fuel burned.”7 They also note that “ships are a dominant contributor over
much of the world oceans to surface concentrations of NO2 and SO2,”8
and predict that by 2050 they will be responsible for “30% of all NOx,

3. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST
C ENTURY 244 (2004), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_
color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf.
4. James J. Corbett & Paul Fischbeck, Emissions from Ships, 278 SCI. 823, 823
(1997).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 823–24. EPA concurs, noting that “[l]arge ships such as container ships,
tankers, bulk carriers, cruise ships, and [l]akers are significant contributors to air pollution in
many of our nation’s cities and ports.” Ocean Vessels and Large Ships, EPA, http://
www.epa.gov/otaq/oceanvessels.htm (last updated Jan. 12, 2012).
7. Hildreth & Torbitt, supra note 2, at 349. These authors also report that “[s]hips are
the world’s most polluting combustion source per metric ton of fuel consumed.” Id. at
348–49.
8. Id. at 349 (internal quotations removed).
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18% of all SOx and 3% of all CO2 emissions.”9 And they constitute “an
increasingly important source of air pollution and greenhouse gas
emissions.”10
Merchant shipping to and from the United States is not expected to
decrease in the foreseeable future. The Ocean Policy Commission reports
that “[a]s the world’s largest trading nation, the United States imports
and exports more merchandise than any other country. . . . [d]omestically,
coastal and inland marine trade amounts to roughly one billion tons of
cargo, worth more than $220 billion, a year.”11 Further, the Commission
recounts that California enjoys a substantial part of this economic
activity (and, presumably, suffers a similar portion of the environmental
consequences), saying “[o]ut of a total of 326 ports nationwide, 10 of
them handle 85 percent of all containerized ship-borne cargo, with the
ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach accounting for nearly 40 percent
of all such cargo.”12 It has been estimated that ships carry more than 95
percent of the nation’s overseas cargo.13
A large percentage of these vessels are registered in foreign States.14
“In 2002 over 7,000 vessels from 81 flag States made more than 53,000
port calls in the United States.”15 The Ocean Policy Commission projected
that “international and domestic marine cargo [will] double” by 2024.16
Finally, the Commission found that “approximately 80 percent of vessel
air emissions occur within 200 miles of the coast and that a major part of
the emissions are concentrated in a few areas in the Northern Hemisphere,
primarily along the east and west coasts of the United States, in the
North Pacific, and in Northern Europe.”17 But such emissions may
travel much longer distances to reach our coasts. As the Commission
also found, “air pollution from human activities in Asia can be carried
across the Pacific Ocean by prevailing . . . winds, with potentially significant
impacts on the concentration and number of air pollutants in North
American coastal areas.”18 And vessel source emissions do not affect
9. Id.
10. Id. at 348. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the bunker fuel used
in merchant vessels “contains an average of approximately 25,000 parts per million (“ppm”)
of sulfur. In contrast, the diesel fuel used for trucks and other motor vehicles is limited
to just 15 ppm of sulfur.” Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154,
1159–60 (9th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3004 (U.S. June 23, 2011)
(No. 10-1555).
11. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 192.
12. Id. at 193.
13. Id. at 236.
14. See infra pp. 209–12 (discussing the significance of this fact).
15. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 240.
16. Id. at 193.
17. Id. at 244.
18. Id.
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only coastal communities. “Ship emissions may contribute to pollution
hundreds of kilometers inland.”19
As mentioned, these vessel emissions have adverse effects on both
public health and global warming. According to the International Council
on Clean Transportation, “diesel PM [particulate matter] emissions from
the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach have been found to
significantly increase the cancer risk [for coastal populations] by at least
100 in a million [people].”20 And, “CO2 emissions from the international
shipping sector as a whole exceed annual total greenhouse gas emissions
from most of the nations listed in the Kyoto Protocol as Annex I
countries.”21
It is difficult to disagree with the Ocean Policy Commission’s
conclusion that “[v]essel activities create significant benefits, but they
also present risks to people and the environment that need to be
effectively addressed.”22
B. The Legal Problems
Any effort to make a significant reduction in atmospheric pollution
from merchant vessels faces two primary hurdles. The first is acquiring
jurisdiction over those vessels and their pollution producing activities.
The second is establishing more environmentally conscious standards
with which such vessels must comply.
In a nutshell, jurisdiction has historically attached to vessels (and
individuals) either because they owe personal allegiance to the country
or are within its sovereign territory. At first blush, it appears that neither
source of jurisdiction will suffice to accomplish our objective here. That
is because a vast majority of the vessel activity that requires more
stringent environmental control does not involve U.S. vessels or crews,
nor does it occur within the “territory” of the United States.
The “citizenship” of a vessel is determined by its nation of registry, or
“flag.” The Commission on Ocean Policy makes a number of cogent points
regarding the “personal jurisdiction” of the United States over merchant
19. Corbett & Fischbeck, supra note 4, at 824.
20. Air Pollution and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ocean-Going Ships:
Impacts, Mitigation Options and Opportunities for Managing Growth, INT’L COUNCIL ON
CLEAN TRANSP. 31 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/
publications/oceangoing_ships_2007.pdf.
21. Hildreth & Torbitt, supra note 2, at 350.
22. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 236.
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vessels plying its waters. It notes that “[t]he vast majority of international
trade is carried on foreign-registered and foreign-crewed vessels that can
be operated at considerably lower cost than U.S.-registered vessels
crewed by U.S. merchant mariners.”23 A few statistics are telling. The
U.S. “share of the international fleet is only 454 vessels, or about 1
percent of the total.”24 “Foreign flag vessels, subject primarily to the
jurisdiction and control of other governments, carry more than 90
percent of international commercial freight entering and departing the
United States and account for 95 percent of passenger ships and 75
percent of cargo ships operating in U.S. waters.”25 The top 10 percent of
“flag” nations register 56 percent of the world’s ships and those ships
may account for up to 65 percent of nitrogen and sulfur emissions.26
There are, of course, internationally established standards that are
intended to control harmful vessel emissions. These standards are set by
an international agreement, known as MARPOL 73/78, and overseen by
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations agency
whose purpose is regulating shipping.27
But reliance on international standards has been subject to criticism on
a number of grounds. First, it has been said that “international rules and
standards [have] been motivated . . . in large part . . . by maritime [S]tates
[desire] to forestall unilateral coastal state regulation,” possibly suggesting
that the shipping interests were not acting in good faith in the process of
setting international standards.28 Second, some commentators have
contended that MARPOL’s standards have been outdated, requiring only
“modest” improvements in emission levels that would have a “negligible”
effect on the environment.29 Corbett and Fischbeck make a similar point,
noting that “[c]urrent [1997] IMO language limits fuel sulfur levels to
4.5%. This provides little reduction, if any, in sulfur and practically codifies

23. Id. at 194.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 236–37. EPA has also commented on the fact, noting that “[s]hips are
significant contributors to the U.S. and Canadian mobile-source emission inventories, though
most are flagged . . . elsewhere.” Designation of North American Emission Control Area
to Reduce Emissions from Ships, EPA 1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/
nonroad/marine/ci/420f10015.pdf (hereinafter EPA Designation 2010).
26. Corbett & Fishbeck, supra note 4, at 824.
27. It is understood that substituting national standards “would lead to a ‘patchwork
quilt’ of potentially conflicting regulations” thus impeding ocean commerce, “which currently
accounts for approximately ninety-five percent of all international trade.” Daniel Bodansky,
Protecting the Marine Environment from Vessel-Source Pollution: UNCLOS III and
Beyond, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 719, 727 (1991) (citing R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE
LAW OF THE SEA 203 (2d ed. 1988)).
28. Id. at 726.
29. Hildreth & Torbitt, supra note 2, at 358.
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the status quo, because ISO [International Organization for Standardization]
limited fuel to 5% sulfur in 1987.”30
Finally, the most common concern is that these international standards
rely on flag State enforcement. Professor Bodansky identifies the problem,
saying “[t]he real question is whether it is sufficient to control vessel-source
pollution. . . . questions remain about the adequacy of flag State
implementation. In part, this can be attributed to the development of
flags of convenience, which may not accept international conventions
such as MARPOL or be willing or able to enforce these standards
adequately.”31 It is widely understood that “since shipowners have wide
latitude in choosing where to register their vessels, they can choose a
‘flag of convenience’ with comparatively lax environmental regulation
or enforcement.”32
Hildreth and Torbitt concur, reporting that “[u]nfortunately, flag State
regulation has suffered from a ‘race to the bottom,’ resulting in few to no
regulations actually being enforced.”33 They explain that “as flag States
compete to gain the benefits of mobility, trade advantages, prestige, and
revenue from fees and taxes that ship registration provides, flag States
ignore or circumvent their duty to enforce the GAIS [generally accepted
international standards] ‘beneath Byzantine layers of corporate owners,
operators, and charterers.’”34 The authors identify Panama, Liberia,
Malta, and the Bahamas as “the flag-of-convenience countries where the
vast majority of all marine vessels are now registered.”35 Professor Allen
has said, concerning the primacy of flag States in enforcement of
international standards, “the wisdom of that formula is increasingly subject
to doubt.”36 The Commission on Ocean Policy appears to agree.37

30. Corbett & Fishbeck, supra note 4, at 824. Nevertheless, the authors conclude
that “in spite of these limitations, both of these global regulations are valuable because
adoption of the IMO regulations means that a multinational consensus has been achieved
on the principles of ship emission control.” Id.
31. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 742 (citing CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 27, at
206–07).
32. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 737. In fact, the very term “flag of convenience”
is commonly understood to be pejorative. For additional examples of flag State shortcomings
in oversight and enforcement, see U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 239.
33. Hildreth & Torbitt, supra note 2, at 354.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 354–55.
36. Craig H. Allen, Revisiting the Thames Formula: The Evolving Role of the
International Maritime Organization and Its Member States in Implementing the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention, 10 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 265, 268 (2009).
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Some have warned of the consequences, pointing out that “[u]nless
states cooperate to develop stronger standards regarding vessel-source
pollution, the likelihood will grow that coastal states will take actions to
protect their environment that go beyond the Convention [UNCLOS],
thereby undermining one of the primary purposes of UNCLOS III,
namely to create a stable regime for the world’s oceans.”38 More recently,
other authorities have reported that those predicted “actions” are now
underway. According to Hildreth and Torbitt, “[p]ort States have responded
to this absence of enforcement of the GAIS by establishing their own
standards that vessels must comply with or stay out of the port.”39
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
These factual and legal problems are not insurmountable. International
law provides means by which coastal States may protect their
environmental interests from merchant vessel emissions, even though those
vessels neither sail under those States’ flags nor violate international
standards within their territory. In fact, there are separate avenues provided
by California and the federal government. These approaches are
complementary, not competing, and are based on different international
authority and processes for adoption.40
First, California has adopted an approach that only applies to vessels
bound for U.S. ports and puts the impetus for enforcement on authorities
in the destination port. Second, the federal government has implemented

37. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 237. Major oil companies
have also recognized this shortcoming. One authority reports that “Shell Oil claims that
20% of the world’s tankers fail to satisfy international safety standards. British
Petroleum failed 299 of the 960 ships it inspected to carry its cargo.” D. HUNTER, J.
SALZMAN & D. ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 718 (David
L. Shapiro et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (citing Joel Haveman, Why Oil Spills Are Increasing,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1993, at A1).
38. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 721.
39. Hildreth & Torbitt, supra note 2, at 355. The authors report that such an effort
was undertaken by California but enjoined by a federal appellate court on the finding that
the federal law, the Clean Air Act, had preempted such State action, referring to Pac.
Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 517 F.3d 1108, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2008).
California has since revised its program in an effort to avoid the preemption issue. A
new attack, by the same plaintiff, challenged the revised program on the ground that the
federal Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1301 et seq., prohibits California from asserting its
police power over activities seaward of its three nautical mile offshore boundary. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California upheld the revised State
program. In a very thorough decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011).
40. “International law has addressed the problem of vessel-source pollution in two
ways: first, by establishing international vessel-source pollution standards that serve as
an alternative to coastal state regulation; and second, by setting forth rules governing the
jurisdiction of flag, coastal, and port [S]tates.” Bodansky, supra note 27, at 725.
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an approach that applies to all vessels passing through waters of the
United States’ 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (except in
the arctic), whether or not bound for a U.S. port. Each approach will be
discussed in turn.
A. Port State Control
Port State control of merchant vessel behavior has been identified as
the direction which international law is taking in the areas of vessel
safety and pollution prevention.41 Professor Bodansky describes it as “a
useful corrective to inadequate flag state enforcement.”42 He points out
that “port states have a direct economic interest in shipping and receiving
goods, and therefore they are more likely . . . to balance environmental
measures against maritime commerce.”43 Traditional economic theory
would undoubtedly agree. On the other hand, a vessel’s flag State has
little or no economic incentive to carry out its enforcement responsibilities.
We look now at the port State’s “authority” to impose emission
conditions on a merchant vessel flying a foreign flag.
1. The Jurisdictional Basis of Port State Enforcement
As noted at the outset, our object here is to identify the legal basis by
which port authorities may dictate the composition of fuel burned by
foreign vessels operated seaward of the port State’s national boundaries.
Simply put, this answer is: the port State’s right to regulate the activity
of someone over whom it has no personal jurisdiction, in an area in
which it has no territorial jurisdiction, is acquired though a process akin
to contract. The port State has complete jurisdiction over the waters of
its port. It may admit or exclude foreign citizens and foreign registered
vessels as it sees fit. If it imposes conditions on entry, and a foreign
vessel enters without complying with those conditions, that vessel has
violated the “contract” and now being within the territory of the port
state, can be punished for that violation.
We now turn to a discussion of the international law bases for such
port state authority.

41. Allen, supra note 36, at 309.
42. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 739.
43. Id. at 739–40 (contrasting port States with “coastal States,” but the logic applies
even more clearly when contrasting “port” and “flag” States).
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a. Customary International Law
Customary international law has long recognized the right of port
states to condition entry permission on compliance with specified
requirements. As Professor McDorman explains, “the host state has
absolute jurisdiction over visiting vessels in the same manner as if the
visiting vessel were a foreign citizen vacationing or doing business in
the host country. The result being that a visiting vessel is subject to and
must comply with the laws and regulations of the host country.”44
“International law is clear that authority of the port [s]tate is superior to
that of the flag [s]tate while the vessel is in port.”45
A port state’s authority goes so far as to permit its insistence on
certain design and construction standards,46 including allowing a port
state to “exercise criminal jurisdiction for violation of its [construction
and design] or discharge standards.”47
In short, “[n]ations have the authority to ensure that foreign flag
vessels visiting their ports are in compliance with applicable international
and domestic requirements.”48
The opinions of experts in the field are, of course, recognized as
“evidence” of international law. Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice lists international conventions, international
custom, general principles, judicial decisions, and “the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists” as means for determining international
law.49 Innumerable experts on the law of the sea have expressed acceptance
of this conclusion. Examples of their recognition of such coastal State
authority, and the significance of its role in the prevention of pollution
by merchant vessels, include the following:
Important in controlling and reducing vessel-source marine pollution is the authority
and willingness of States to enact and enforce standards against foreign vessels that
are voluntarily in their ports.50

44. Ted McDorman, Regional Port State Agreements: Some Issues of International
Law, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 207, 210 (2000).
45. Id. at 211; see CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 27, at 65–67; see also Ted
McDorman, Port State Enforcement: A Comment on Article 218 of the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 305, 308 (1997).
46. Allen, supra note 36, at 279; see, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a)(c)(2) (2006) (requiring
that certain tankers have double hulls as a condition of entry into its ports); see also infra
note 98.
47. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 745–47; see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note
27, at 219.
48. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 240.
49. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.
50. McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 45, at 306.
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The enforcement authority by coastal States with respect to vessels in port has
long been recognized as one of the keys to the development of an effective
international regime to prevent marine pollution.51
[C]oastal [S]tates have claimed the right to exercise prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution. This claim is largely based on
the territorial principle, since coastal states have sovereignty over their internal
waters and territorial sea.52
Port [S]tate jurisdiction is generally defined as jurisdiction based solely on the
presence of the vessel in port.53
[T]he major difference lies in the ‘voluntary’ character of the ship’s presence in
port.54
Coastal State jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels is most extensive when the
vessel voluntarily enters (or is en route to) a port or an offshore terminal of the
coastal State.55
[V]oluntary presence in port . . . is an essential element of port State jurisdiction.56
[P]ort-[S]tate jurisdiction strengthens compliance with national rules and regulations
without any interference with the freedom of navigation as entry into port constitutes
a voluntary submission of the vessel to the jurisdiction of the port state . . .
concurrently with the original jurisdiction of the flag [S]tate.57

It was also the understanding of the United States in adopting Annex
VI of MARPOL (a tool to regulate greenhouse gas emissions) that
Annex VI “did not prohibit parties from imposing stricter emission
limits or fuel oil standards as a condition of entry into U.S. ports and
internal waters.”58
Customary international law of the sea, and the authorities that deal in
it, are in agreement. Port states may condition port entry on compliance
with international and local pollution control standards, and may enforce
those standards on foreign flag vessels in their ports.
51. Id. (quoting B RIAN D. S MITH, S TATE R ESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT 173 (1988)).
52. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 737.
53. Id. at 738.
54. MARIA GAVOUNELI, FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 44
(2008) (citing McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 41, at 305–22).
55. Allen, supra note 36, at 279.
56. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, ENFORCEMENT BY PORT STATES:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ARTICLE 218 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA (LAW OF THE SEA SERIES) 2 (2002) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT BY PORT
STATES].
57. GAVOUNELI, supra note 54, at 44.
58. Hildreth & Torbitt, supra note 2, at 363, (citing 152 Cong. Rec. S3400 (daily
ed. Apr. 7, 2006)).
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b. Conventional International Law
Conventional international law is completely in accord with the
principles developed under customary international rules.59 The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), sometimes
referred to as “The Constitution of the Oceans,” provides that,
[i]n the case of ships proceeding to internal waters [which are universally
understood to include ‘ports’] or a call at a port facility outside internal waters,
the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any
breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or
such a call is subject.60

Article 25(2) clearly recognizes two rights of the coastal State: the right
to condition entry into its ports and the right to enforce breaches of those
conditions.
Such recognition is consistent with the purposes of UNCLOS. As J.
Peter Bernhardt points out, “[o]ne of the principle aims of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has been to establish effective
prescriptive and enforcement regimes for the prevention of pollution
from vessels . . .”61 Bernhardt suggests that this “aim” was advanced by
“[t]he concept of port-State enforcement . . . [which] was designed to
meet the legitimate need of the coastal State to protect its offshore
environment from vessel-source pollution.”62
The general consensus is that this UNCLOS objective has been met.
According to one authority,
UNCLOS III [the UN conference which produced the 1982 UNCLOS Convention]
resolves any doubt that may have existed about whether coastal States may
adopt national CDEM [Construction, Design, Equipment and Manning] standards
for their ports and internal waters by explicitly referring to the possibility of States
establishing ‘particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of

59. Unless otherwise indicated, the relevant convention is the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
60. UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 25(2); see also J. Peter A. Bernhardt, A Schematic
Analysis of Vessel-Source Pollution: Prescriptive and Enforcement Regimes in the Law
of the Sea Conference, 20 VA. J. INT’L L. 265, 291(1980) (reasoning that “[i]f such a
clear right is given, certainly the coastal, and thus the port, State may take action against
a ship for breach of those conditions once it is voluntarily within the port. This
interpretation [is] supported by application of lex specialis generalis derogate” and
because Article 25 appears after Articles 24(1)(a) and 21(2), which specifically limit
similar coastal State jurisdiction seaward of internal waters, such as ports).
61. Bernhardt, supra note 60, at 265; see also McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 45,
at 305 (describing vessel pollution as the “central marine environmental concern” of
UNCLOS).
62. Bernhardt, supra note 60, at 269–70; see generally ENFORCEMENT BY PORT
STATES, supra note 56, at 7 (providing a legislative history of the conferees’ consideration of
port State jurisdiction, including port entry denial).
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pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels
into their ports or internal waters.’63

Moreover, Professor Bodansky notes that “[t]he expansion of port state
jurisdiction by UNCLOS III is often regarded as one of the Convention’s
most significant features.”64 Dr. Gavouneli uses similar language regarding
the expansion of jurisdiction, calling it “an innovation of the Convention”
and “the most important innovation of the enforcement system.”65
It appears that this innovation in the law of the sea has resulted in new
rules for protection of the environment and enforcement of those rules.
Professor McDorman reports that “[f]oreign vessels voluntarily in port
are being subjected to an increasing array of local laws regarding
navigational safety and marine environmental protection.”66
One of the problems identified at the outset of this paper was a
reliance on flag State enforcement of merchant vessel operations and the
perceived “laxity” of that enforcement. The expansion of port-State
authority should not be understood to displace the flag State’s traditional
authority. Under UNCLOS, flag States retain all of their rights, and
responsibilities, as to their registered vessels. The flag State’s role has
been described as the “primary responsibility for regulating vessel safety
and pollution prevention.”67 As Professor Allen explains, UNCLOS
“allocates jurisdiction and responsibility for enforcing vessel safety and
pollution prevention rules and standards among flag States [Art. 217],
coastal States [Art. 220], and port States [Art. 218].”68
Flag states have not lost any authority. Rather, coastal states and port
states have simply been authorized to assure rule compliance. This
result has been described as a “partial compromise”69 on the principal

63. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 747 (comparing UNCLOS, supra note 59, art.
211(3) with Cheng-Pang Wang, A Review of the Enforcement Regime for Vessel-Source
Oil Pollution Control, 16 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 305, 328–29 (1986) (noting that “the
term ‘condition for the entry of foreign vessels’ used in Article 211.3 could be
interpreted as including the consent . . . to follow the coastal [S]tate’s national CDEM
standards” as a condition of port entry)).
64. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 759 (citing CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 27, at
259).
65. GAVOUNELI, supra note 54, at 44 (quoting BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 180 (1989)).
66. McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 45, at 322.
67. Allen, supra note 36, at 290 (citing UNCLOS, supra note 59, arts. 94, 217).
68. Id. at 276.
69. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 725.
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debating point: balancing coastal State and flag State enforcement.70 As
Professor McDorman points out, “[t]he innovation of Article 218 is that
it permits a port State to initiate action even where the offending
discharge had no effect in the port State.”71 He unequivocally concludes
that UNCLOS and the Territorial Sea Convention “contain no limitations
on the criminal, civil, or other jurisdiction of a local State over foreign
vessels voluntarily in its ports.”72
In sum, UNCLOS can be said to strengthen port and coastal State
enforcement by codifying pre-existing customary international law
regarding a port State’s control of merchant vessels bound for its internal
waters. Authorities are in agreement. “Article 211(3) . . . acknowledges
that a coastal State can impose requirements respecting prevention,
reduction, and control of marine pollution on foreign vessels as a
condition of entry to ports and internal waters.”73 According to the
University of Virginia’s Center for Oceans Law and Policy, Article 211(3)
“lays the basis for what is commonly termed ‘port State jurisdiction.’”74
2. Limitations to Port State Jurisdiction
Some of the broad statements above may suggest that there are no
limits to a port State’s authority to condition, or deny, a foreign vessel’s
entry into its port. That is not quite the case. Rather, it would be more
accurate to say there are no “onerous” limitations to such authority.
The most common limitations are entry rights established by treaty.
Churchill and Lowe point out that “despite the absence of a right of
access in customary law, most States enjoy such rights in foreign ports
under treaty.”75 Perhaps the best multilateral example is the Convention
and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports.76 The issue
is also often addressed in bilateral “friendship treaties.”
70. McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 45, at 306.
71. Id. at 322.
72. Id. at 309; see also Bernard H. Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren
Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 830, 844 (2006).
73. McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 45, at 309; see also LINDY S. JOHNSON,
COASTAL STATE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 52 (2004); McDorman,
Agreements, supra note 44, at 218; Allen, supra note 36, at 297.
74. 4 CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 203 (Myron H.
Nordquist ed., 1991); see also LOUIS B. SOHN & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 408 (2004) (discussing other international agreements which
recognize port State jurisdiction over foreign vessels).
75. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 27, at 47; see also McDorman, Enforcement,
supra note 45, at 311.
76. Convention and Statute on the Int’l Regime of Maritime Ports, Dec. 9, 1923,
58 L.N.T.S. 285; see McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 45, at 310; see also
McDorman, Agreements, supra note 44, at 218–19.
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The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade does not address the
authority of port states to condition or deny entry, except to express that
such authority may not be used as a tool of “trade” discrimination.
Professor McDorman explains that, under the test, entry may be controlled
“provided the port state determines access and imposes conditions based
on the peculiarities of the vessel (i.e., the vessel is sub-standard) and
without discrimination on the basis of flag or between foreign and
national vessels, and the measure is not designed to be a disguised trade
barrier.”77
While generally adopting pre-existing customary international law
regarding port State enforcement, UNCLOS contains a number of provisions
to safeguard the interests of merchant vessels during proceedings brought
against them in a foreign port. Such provisions seek to ensure the
efficiency of such processes, protect the rights of the accused, and avoid
endangerment to vessels and the environment.78 Although a requirement
that port State standards be published is often listed as a limitation to the
rule, the basic principle remains.79 Absent treaty obligations, “coastal States
may impose conditions on foreign vessels regarding access to their ports
and may deny access altogether.”80
3. Port State Enforcement and Penalties
Enforcement authorities have “prosecutorial discretion” in considering
whether punishment will be sought for a specific violation. This has
been particularly true in the law of the sea context. Traditionally, coastal
States have not prosecuted violations of their laws that occur on foreign
flag vessels while within their internal waters unless the activity in question
affects the “peace and good order” of the coastal State.81 Instead,

77. McDorman, Agreements, supra note 44, at 221.
78. See UNCLOS, supra note 59, arts. 223–33; see also JOHNSON, supra note 73,
at 47–50; see also Allen, supra note 36, at 296 (describing the UNCLOS safeguards as
provisions “to guard against abusive investigative practices, unreasonable detentions, and
hearing procedures that are fundamentally unfair.”).
79. Allen, supra note 36, at 298–99.
80. McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 45, at 311; see, e.g., 33 CFR § 160.107
(2012) (“District Commander or Captain of the Port, subject to recognized principles or
international law, may deny entry into the navigable waters of the United States or to any
port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to any vessel not in
compliance with the provisions of the Port and Tanker Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1221–1232)
or the regulations issued thereunder.”).
81. See SOHN & NOYES, supra note 74, at 382–83.
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enforcement is left to the flag State or, in appropriate instances, the
sovereign to which an individual participant owes allegiance.82 Following
such precedents, port States might defer to other countries for enforcement.
However, that seems unlikely in the circumstances of concern here.
Clearly, violations of environmental controls would adversely affect
the port State’s peace and good order. That is one of the reasons that the
legal requirements were imposed in the first place. Another is that the
likely alternative jurisdiction, the flag State, has probably been considered
lax in enforcing similar requirements in the past.
For these reasons, the port State will likely not forego its authority to
enforce environment rules, nor is it required to. The traditional practice
of deferring to flag States for punishment is not based on any legal
requirement, but on international comity.83 We can expect that it will
not be followed in cases involving port State protection of environmental
interests from foreign flag merchant ships.
Interestingly, little has been written about the penalties that may be
imposed by a port State for the violations of concern here. According to
Professor Allen, the UNCLOS Convention contains “no restriction” on
the right of a state to establish port entry requirements. “[T]the coastal
State has the right to take any necessary steps to prevent a breach of the
conditions of port entry.”84 Professor McDorman adds that “[t]here does
not appear to be any restriction in international law regarding the type of
penalty that can be levied against a foreign vessel which, while in port,
breaches such laws or standards.”85
Professor McDorman does, however, raise an interesting question as
to whether all port States may benefit from the port State jurisdiction
described in Article 218 of UNCLOS. In the foregoing discussion, port
State jurisdiction is described as being founded primarily on customary

82. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 27, at 54–55 (“But since ships are more or
less self-contained units, having not only a comprehensive body of laws—those of the
flag State—applicable to them while in foreign ports, but also a system for the enforcement of
those flag State laws through the powers of the captain and the local consul, coastal States
commonly enforce their laws only in cases where their interests are engaged; matters
relating solely to the ‘internal economy’ of the ship are left to the authorities of the flag
State.”).
83. See id. at 55 (“The Anglo-American position . . . summarized in American Cases
such as Cunard S.S. v. Mellon (1923), is that the coastal State’s jurisdiction over foreign
ships in its port is complete, but that it may, as a matter of policy, choose to forgo the
exertion of its jurisdiction.”).
84. Allen, supra note 36, at 294 (citing UNCLOS, supra note 59; Oxman, supra
note 72, at 844).
85. McDorman, Agreements, supra note 44, at 223. The author goes on to discuss
the monetary consequence of detaining offending vessels while enforcement proceedings
progress and the provisions of UNCLOS which deal with that issue, particularly Articles
219 and 226(1). Id. at 223.
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international law. McDorman cites prominent authorities for the proposition
that Article 218 is an expansion of the pre-existing international law of
port State jurisdiction. He reasons that “the port State clause in the
UNCLOS Convention confers on the local State new authority over
foreign vessels voluntarily in port . . . and that it cannot be confidently
concluded that the provisions have entered into the corpus of customary
international law.”86
Standing alone, this conclusion might be read as being of only academic
concern. However, from that proposition, McDorman quite logically
points out that “at least for the time being, only parties to the UNCLOS
Convention can benefit from the Article 218 port State enforcement
jurisdiction.”87 Three years later, he renewed his conclusion, stating that
“[i]t is highly questionable whether Article 218 of the Law of the Sea
Convention [footnote omitted] has emerged as part of customary
international law.”88
Our interest here is in determining whether a port State is prohibited
by UNCLOS from attaching conditions to a foreign flag vessel’s entry
into its internal waters. We believe that Professor McDorman’s conclusion,
and that of the authorities upon which he relies, cannot be read to mean
that the longstanding customary international law right to condition
“port entry” has been superseded by UNCLOS, with the consequence
that only parties to that Treaty can impose port entry conditions. Our
reasoning proceeds as follows.
First, the McDorman approach seems to concede that there had been a
long history of port State control prior to the negotiation of UNCLOS.
Article 218 is described as including “innovative expansions” of
international law. However, there is no suggestion that a port State’s
“conditioning” such entry was one of those “innovative expansions.”
Clearly, it was not. The substantive provisions of UNCLOS that instead
deal with port State authority are both traditional and new. Nothing in

86. McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 45, at 320 (citing GEORGE C. KASOULIDES,
PORT STATE CONTROL AND JURISDICTION: EVOLUTION OF THE PORT STATE REGIME 183–
84 (1993); CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 27, at 259; Thomas A. Clingan, VesselSource Pollution, Problems of Hazardous Cargo, and Port State Jurisdiction, in
INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION: ROCKS AND SHOALS AHEAD? 273, 277 (Jon M. Van Dyke,
Lewis M. Alexander & Joseph R. Morgan eds., 1988).
87. See McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 45, at 318–20. Before reaching this
conclusion, McDorman had considered a number of additional factors which, he concluded,
weighed in favor of his determination. Id. at 318–20.
88. McDorman, Agreements, supra note 44, at 216–17.
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the Convention, or its legislative history, indicates intent to retain preexisting port State authority for parties to UNCLOS, but deprive nonparty sovereigns of long-enjoyed rights to condition entry into internal
waters.
Second, the right of port states to condition entry to internal waters fits
a recognized basis for such control—that being complete sovereignty
over internal waters. States have long been understood to have the same
control over their internal water as is held over their land territory.
Third, the authorities cited seem to focus only on Article 218 of
UNCLOS. Perhaps that Article, which authorizes port States to participate
in the enforcement of internationally established emission standards
beyond their national sovereignty, is not part of customary international
law. But Article 218 is not the only relevant provision of UNCLOS.
Article 211(3) speaks directly to the issue here—“port entry conditions.”
The relevant provision of paragraph (3) specifically recognizes that States
may “establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution . . . as a condition of entry of foreign vessels into
their ports or internal waters.”89 In such cases, the port State is enforcing
local law that is violated within national territory—not international law
violated beyond its sovereignty. The former assertion of jurisdiction is
founded on long-established rights of customary international law. The
latter assertion is founded on novel authority arising from UNCLOS
itself. There is no indication in UNCLOS that longstanding port State
rights were, henceforth, to be denied to non-party States.
4. Crafting “Conditions of Entry”
The objective of the foregoing analysis was described above as
“controlling atmospheric pollution from foreign flag vessels when they
are seaward of our national boundaries.” Yet most of what followed was
a survey of international law that produced the conclusion that coastal
States may impose conditions on foreign vessel entering into their ports.
The time has come to make clear the relationship between the two points.
The key to successful port State control over foreign vessel activities
beyond national boundaries is in crafting the description of the prohibited
activity. It must be clear that the prohibition is violated while the vessel
is indisputably subject to the port State’s jurisdiction. That is, the illegal

89. UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 211(3). For an expanded discussion, see
GAVOUNELI, supra note 54, at 46.
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activity must occur in port.90 But, it is not always easy to understand the
“process” for acquiring port State jurisdiction.
Lindy Johnson may have come up with the most straightforward
explanation. She explains:
[I]f a port State has identified an important interest to protect, it will impose
port entry conditions on a ship for activities in or beyond its territorial sea.91
If a ship voluntarily enters port without complying with [those conditions,] the
violation occurs while the ship is in the territory of that State.92
[A] port State could draft its regulations imposing these conditions so that the
violation itself is not the actual activity occurring beyond the territorial sea, but
the entry into port after a ship has engaged in such activity.93

For example, if the object is to regulate atmospheric emissions 200
nautical miles offshore, the violation must be something like “entering
internal waters” after having been responsible for such emissions.94

90. See McDorman, Enforcement, supra note 45, at 311–12 (“[T]he local State can
enact and enforce environmental laws and vessel standards where the actions or inactions
that breach the local law occur or exist while the vessel is in port.”); McDorman, Agreements,
supra note 44, at at 216 (“[The] port state can only enforce laws that relate to activities
of a foreign vessel that take place while the vessel is in port.”) (emphasis in original).
Particularly difficult questions arise when port States impose CDEM standards which
are more demanding than internationally recognized standards, but at least one recognized
authority has taken the position that “the better view is that if such CDEM standards are
made conditions of port entry, the port or coastal State may take such enforcement
action, because then a violation of national CDEM law takes place while the ship is in
port.” Bernhardt, supra note 60, at 290–91.
91. JOHNSON, supra note 73 at 41–42; see also id. at 42 n.141 (containing examples
and other authorities).
92. Id. at 40; infra notes 141–144 and authorities cited therein.
93. Id. at 42–43. The author puts this slightly differently when she says “the violation
is not the use of a piece of equipment when the ship is beyond the territorial waters, but
the entry into port after not using the equipment.” Id. at 52, 54.
94. Although we have emphasized the traditional customary international law
basis for port State control, the comprehensive UNCLOS now includes a conventional
international law recognition of such jurisdiction when, through Article 211(3) of the
“Constitution of the Oceans,” it provides that “States which establish particular
requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine
environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or internal
waters . . . shall give due publicity to such requirements.” UNCLOS, supra note 59, art.
211(3).
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5. Port State Control in the United States
Long established American jurisprudence recognizes the right of a
coastal State to assert jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels so long as
that control represents a reasonable balance between legitimate sovereign
interests and lawful commerce.95 Recent federal decisions provide an
example of the principles discussed above.
a. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. v. United States:96
A Federal Case Study of Port State Control
A United States Coast Guard aircraft observed the cruise ship Nordic
Empress discharging oil in Bahamian waters, while en route to the
United States. Upon the vessel’s arrival in Miami, the Coast Guard
conducted a document and safety inspection. During its review of the
vessel’s oil record book, the Coast Guard observed that there was no
entry for the discharge observed on February 1, 1993.97
On the suspicion that the discharge nevertheless occurred, and
following international protocol, the United States “referred this matter
to a representative of the government of Liberia [the flag State] via the
Department of State.”98 Approximately a year after the event, the Liberian
government replied, finding that “it was difficult to respond to the
allegations of improperly recorded Oil Record Book entries . . . and
recommended expunging the allegation.”99
However, case preparation continued, an indictment was returned
alleging, inter alia, that the defendant “failed to record the overboard
discharge of oil contaminated bilge waste” in violation of U.S. law, and
defendant filled a Motion to Dismiss.100
On denial of that Motion, the Court made the following statements:
We agree with [defendant] that the careful international regulatory balance created
by MARPOL [the relevant treaty] must be respected. Equally compelling,
however, is the right of the United States to enforce its laws within its borders.
See Wilson v. Girard, supra. If the policy goal of a comprehensive regime of
anti-pollution measures is to be achieved, it is necessary that domestic and
international law work together to the extent possible to maximize
enforcement. The discharge of oil in an improper manner is one crime; the failure to
keep an Oil Record Book as required by MARPOL/APPS is another; and the

95.
96.
1998).
97.
98.
99.
100.
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Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187, 235 (1804).
United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Fla.
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1361–62.
Id. at 1362.
Id.
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deliberate presentation of a false material writing to the U.S. Coast Guard is
another.101

Having already determined that the United States had jurisdiction to
bring the case, the District Court found as an alternative, “the
extraterritoriality doctrine providing jurisdiction over certain extraterritorial
offenses ‘whose extraterritorial acts are intended to have an effect within
the sovereign territory.’”102
The Royal Caribbean decision raises an additional point that could be
useful in future port State prosecutions. Defendants argued that
‘conventional international law,’ UNCLOS, has superseded the ‘customary
international law’ upon which we primarily rely in support of port State
jurisdiction. In pleading the Royal Caribbean case, the executive branch
of the federal government—the branch primarily responsible for
international relations—took the following positions: “UNCLOS does
not . . . regulate what a nation can do to enforce its domestic laws in
port” and “UNCLOS places no restriction on the enforcement of domestic
laws for violations committed while a ship is in port.”103 In future litigation,
whether or not involving the federal government, these interpretations of
international law may be helpful to State prosecutors.
Royal Caribbean also provides an excellent example of the importance of
properly casting both the domestic legislation’s prohibited activity and
any allegation of violation.
The key to successful prosecution is making clear that the violation is
entering port without having complied with identified conditions—not
merely failing to meet those conditions. The federal government
has imposed port entry conditions to protect a broad range of other
public interests. Some examples include:
•

A requirement that petroleum tankers entering United States
ports have double hulls to reduce the threat of oil spills
through collision.104

101. Id. at 1368; see also Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957) (“A sovereign
nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its
borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.”).
102. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (citing United States v.
Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 950 (11th Cir. 1985)).
103. Id. at 1370.
104. The condition was prompted by the 1989 Exxon Valdez grounding and the 11
million gallons of crude oil spilled in Prince William Sound, Alaska. It has since been
adopted worldwide through an IMO regulation. International Convention for the Prevention
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An effort to control aquatic nuisance species from spreading by
requiring segregated ballast tanks.105
A requirement that certain vessels employ inert gas systems.106
Finally, for port security reasons, the Coast Guard requirement
of advance notice of a merchant vessel’s arrival in a port of
the United States.107
b. Pacific Merchant Shipping Association: A State Case
Study of Port State Control

California has, for many years, grappled with severe air pollution and
its health consequences. The federal Clean Air Act of 1970 gives States
a leadership role in attacking the nation’s air pollution problems. In
carrying out that role, California has made substantial gains in reducing
air pollution from stationary and mobile sources within its boundaries.
Now it is moving aggressively to reduce vessel source pollution, and its
adverse health and climate consequences, from operations both within
and beyond its waters.
The state proposal has been challenged in the Courts by an organization
that speaks for the regulated industry. In its most recent brief before the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, California explained the importance of
regulating such pollution from merchant vessels. For example, it reports
that:
[sulfur oxide] emissions from ocean-going vessels are the single largest source
of [sulfur oxide] emissions in the State, responsible for 40% of all [sulfur oxide]
emitted. The [particulate matter] emissions from these vessels are also significant,
equivalent to about 150,000 California big rig trucks traveling 125 miles per
day.108

of Pollution from Ships, Annex I, Reg. 13(F)(3), Nov. 2, 1973, as amended by Protocol, Feb.
17, 1978 [hereinafter MARPOL Annex I]. On its face, the U.S. requirement applies to
all vessels operating on “all waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, including
the Exclusive Economic Zone.” 46 U.S.C. § 3703a(c)(2) (2006). However, its legislative
history makes clear that “[t]his section is not intended to apply to vessels transiting U.S.
waters or transiting the Exclusive Economic Zone in innocent passage.” H.R. Rep. No.
101-653, at 141 (1990). Consequently, “this requirement has been understood and applied
only as a matter of port entry.” Johnson, supra note 69, at 54, n.177.
105. 16 U.S.C. §4701 (1996); 33 C.F.R. §157.09 (2009). Such non-native species
have been recognized as “an insidious threat to States’ resources, property, and even public
health.” JOHNSON, supra note 69, at 57.
106. 46 C.F.R. § 32.53 (2008).
107. 33 C.F.R. § 160.212 (2011). This Coast Guard regulation requires vessels on
voyages of less than 24 hours to give 24 hours advance notice of arrival and vessels on
voyages of 96 hours or more to give 96 hours advance notice of arrival in a U.S. port.
108. Brief for Appellee-Defendant at 2, Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F. 3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-17765).
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The state goes on to explain that emission levels from merchant vessels
are high, in part, because vessels usually use bunker fuel.109 Bunker
fuel contains mostly residual fuel, the lowest grade and cheapest fuel
available.110 In comparison to the 0.0015% (15 parts per million) sulfur
limit for diesel fuel for trucks and other motor vehicles in California,
residual fuel contains an average of 2.7% (27,000 parts per million) of
sulfur.111
In its first effort to combat the adverse pollution effects of these
products, the California Air Resources Board imposed “standards” on
merchant vessels within twenty-four miles of its coasts to limit emissions of
particulate matter, nitrogen oxide, and sulfur oxide.112 The Pacific
Merchant Shipping Association (“PMSA”) challenged the program on
numerous grounds, including contentions that Congress had preempted
State establishment of such standards through the Clean Air Act and the
Submerged Lands Act.113 The federal district court ruled that the State
approach was preempted by the Clean Air Act and enjoined its
enforcement.114 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later affirmed.115
On the second attempt, California did not impose an “emissions
standard” as a means of reducing air pollution from merchant vessels.
Instead, it focused on regulations on the fuel producing the undesirable
levels of pollution and imposed “in use requirements.” For example,
California now dictates the maximum sulfur content of fuels.116 In
practical effect, this means that merchant vessels bound to or from
California ports must do three things: burn cleaner fuels when within 24
nautical miles of the State’s coastline, keep records of when and where
they switched to the designate fuels, and be prepared to present those
records—and other proof of their compliance with California law—to the
Executive Officer of the California Air Resources Board.117

109. Id.
110. Id. at 2 (citing to the district court record).
111. Id. at 2–3.
112. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13 § 2299.1(a), (b)(1) (2011).
113. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Cackette, No. CIV. S-06-2791 WBS KJM,
2007 WL 2914961, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2007).
114. Id. at *2.
115. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 517 F.3d at 1112 (9th Cir. 2008).
116. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13 § 2299.2(a), (e)(1) (2011); see also CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 17 § 93118.2(a), (e)(1) (2011).
117. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 2299.2(b)(1)(F), (d)(30)(F), (e)(2)(A)–(C) (2011).
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PMSA also challenged this new program. It relied, primarily, on two
bases. Each basis alleges that the federal government has preempted the
field. PMSA first contended that Congress, through the Submerged Lands
Act, has preempted assertions of California’s police power seaward of
the State’s 3 nautical mile offshore boundary.118 Second, PMSA contended
that, through the Constitution itself, the federal government has preempted
State regulation of all interstate and international commerce.119
This time the federal district court found for California.120 PMSA
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but the appellate court
upheld the lower court decision.121
c. Legal Opinion of the Attorney General of the United States
By unusual coincidence, the U.S. Attorney General in 1977 published
an official opinion that touched upon many of the questions of concern
in Pacific Merchant Shipping. The relevant facts were indistinguishable.
The Acting General Counsel of the Federal Energy Administration
sought the Attorney General’s opinion regarding whether the State of
California would have jurisdiction and authority to regulate emissions
from oil tankers bound for a proposed tanker terminal at Long Beach,
California while such tankers are operating beyond the 3-mile territorial
limit of the State.122 Addressing preemption, commerce clause, and State
power concerns, the Attorney General ultimately concluded that
California has authority to regulate operations taking place beyond the 3mile limit.123
The Attorney General addressed statutory preemption concerns by
reasoning that “a basic object of the Clean Air Act is to preserve the
primary role of the States with respect to control of air pollution.”124 For
that reason, California’s proposal to regulate emissions from tankers was

118. Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at 12–13, Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F. 3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-17765).
119. However, PMSA at times seemed to acknowledge California’s authority to
assert full police power within its internal waters (landward of its baseline) and territorial
waters (3 nautical miles seaward of its baseline). Id. at 21, 25, 31, 35–39.
120. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d at 1158 (9th Cir. 2011).
121. Id.
122. State Jurisdiction to Regulate Pollutant Emissions, 1 Op. O.L.C. 141 (1977)
[hereinafter O.L.C.]. In 1977, the territorial sea of the United States extended 3 nautical
miles off the coast, as did the boundary of California. The maritime area between 3 and 12
nautical miles was, at that time, a “contiguous zone” over which the federal government
asserted certain internationally recognized jurisdiction short of full sovereignty. U.S.
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,906 (June 15, 1972).
123. O.L.C., supra note 122, at 147.
124. Id. at 145 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 262 U.S. 440, 445–46
(1960)).
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reasonable because the purpose of the requirements was to protect the air
over the State’s territory.125 With limited exceptions, the Clean Air Act
does not preempt use of the State’s authority to impose standards
regarding air pollution.126
In response to potential interstate commerce concerns, the opinion
cites Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,127 and its progeny that support
the view that the proposed California standards would not be invalid.
From these cases, the opinion notes:
Congress has indicated its view that, with regard to air pollution, variation from
State to State is permissible. Even if the California standards were to impose
requirements going beyond Coast Guard regulations and entailing substantial
expense (e.g., additional equipment or changes in the vessels), California could
assert that the seriousness of its air pollution justifies the measures it has
adopted.128

Finishing with consideration of the reach of California’s police power,
the Attorney General’s response noted that:
States retain the authority to exercise independent police power to deal with air
pollution. If the requisite nexus exists, that authority could be used to reach conduct
in the contiguous zone [i.e. beyond State boundaries] . . . [T]his is another area
where the issue of jurisdiction over foreign ships is raised. In our opinion,
California possesses some regulatory authority over such ships.129

Based on the foregoing, the Attorney General concluded that assuming
there is no conflict with an applicable treaty, Federal statute or regulation,
California would have authority to regulate foreign ships, as well as
United States ships, using the proposed terminal.130 Thus, “[f]or purposes
of international law, the authority to impose such conditions [on the use
of its ports] may be exercised not only by the Federal Government but
also by a State government.”131 This interpretation, which California has

125. Id. at 146.
126. Id. at 144 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (2011) (transferred and now appears as 42
U.S.C. § 7401 (2011) which provides that there is no such preemption so long as the
standard based upon state law is not less stringent than standards set forth in the Clean
Air Act).
127. 362 U.S. 440 (1960)
128. O.L.C., supra note 122, at 145.
129. Id. at 146–47.
130. Id. at 146.
131. Id. at 147.
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submitted to the Ninth Circuit as “supplemental authority,” would seem
to give additional support to the state’s case.132
In summary, port State control of merchant vessel pollution can help
overcome the inefficiencies of traditional internationally set standards
and flag state enforcement. Port state authority has long been recognized as
a logical extension of the port state’s right to set conditions for entry.
Port states may not be able to enforce entry conditions beyond their
maritime boundaries, but they can condition entry upon compliance upon
such conditions.133 Moreover, those conditions can be enforced in port
(clearly within the territorial jurisdiction of the State) even though the
undesirable emissions occurred beyond the boundaries of the State.
Although the reasoning and result may appear to be little more than
slick lawyering to avoid traditions of flag state control, it is not. Port
state control has long been accepted in customary international law. It is
efficient to adopt—there being no need to coordinate with, nor get the
approval of, international organizations. At first blush, it might appear
to leave much room for unreasonable reaching by port states. However,
authorities balance that concern with the realization that the economics
of operating a port are meaningful to a port State; and before imposing
conditions on entry, any State will weigh carefully any potential loss of
business to a competing port.
One disadvantage of port state control, as contrasted with coastal state
control, is that the former jurisdiction attaches only if the vessel in
question intends to enter, or is leaving, the port. A port State may not
impose its port entry conditions on vessels merely passing through its
territorial sea or a more seaward zone of its maritime jurisdiction en
route to a third State.
We turn now to our second alternative for controlling pollution from
foreign flag merchant vessels—that being “coastal State” control.
B. Coastal State Control
As we use the term here, “coastal state control” refers to the authority
of a coastal sovereign to regulate emissions from ocean going vessels in
various zones of maritime jurisdiction adjacent to its coasts. This
approach differs, at least theoretically, from port State control in that it is
accomplished primarily through conventional, rather than customary,
132. See Letter from Nicholas Stern, Cal. Deputy Attorney Gen., to Molly Dwyer,
Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, (Apr. 30, 2010).
133. The few exceptions to this argument do not limit its general applicability.
They include port entry pursuant to a treaty right, diplomatic immunity of government
vessels, and as required by weather or emergency. We should also note that conditions of
entry may not result in discrimination against vessels flying a particular sovereign’s flag.
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international law. Nevertheless, its object is much the same—the allocation
of jurisdiction over merchant vessels between flag and coastal States.
Two international agreements are especially relevant. They are
UNCLOS and The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL”) Annex VI.134 The two play different
roles in allocating coastal State control over maritime pollution and
we will discuss them separately.
1. The UNCLOS Approach135
a. Generally Applicable Zones of Maritime Jurisdiction
Professor Bodansky explains that under UNCLOS, “the balancing of
coastal and maritime interests has been undertaken in broad geographic
terms by dividing the oceans into different zones and internal waters; the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone and . . . the exclusive economic zone.
Each zone has its own allocation of jurisdiction between coastal and flag
states.”136 We begin by identifying these zones.

134. UNCLOS, supra note 59; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 (entered into force Oct. 16, 1978) [hereinafter
MARPOL Annex VI], amended by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546
(entered into force Oct. 16, 1978). MARPOL Annexes I and II were amended
and reorganized, effective Jan. 1, 2007. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Amendments
to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Marine Env’t Prot. Comm. MEPC. 117 (52) (Oct.
15, 2004); IMO, Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, Marine Env’t
Prot. Comm. MEPC. 118 (52) (Oct. 15, 2004).
135. We note here that although the United States was actively involved in the
lengthy negotiations that led to UNCLOS, Presidents of both major political parties have
endorsed it, and it is pending ratification in the Senate, the United States is not yet party
to the Treaty because the Senate’s requisite “advice and consent” has not yet been given.
Nevertheless, federal courts have determined that the Treaty provisions are relevant in
these circumstances on at least two bases. First, UNCLOS “carries the weight of law . . .
from the date of its submission by the President to the Senate.” Royal Caribbean
Cruises, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)). And second,
the court concludes that “[i]t does appear from all of the testimony produced in this case,
as well as the case law in this area, that UNCLOS is properly considered customary
international law.” Id. at 1372. Interestingly, the court had taken the testimony of
renowned experts in the law of the sea in the case before it. See, e.g., SOHN & NOYES,
supra note 74, at 405; see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1161–62
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
136. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 737–38.
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Internal Waters: Internal waters lie landward of the baseline from
which the more seaward zones of maritime jurisdiction are measured.137
As has just been discussed at length, internal waters—which include rivers,
bays, lakes, and ports—fall under the full sovereignty of the coastal State.
As a general proposition, individuals (and vessels) within those waters
are subject to the sovereign’s anti-pollution legislation.
Territorial Sea: The territorial sea is a belt of water immediately
adjacent to the baseline and extending offshore to a distance of up to 12
nautical miles. The coastal State’s jurisdiction over its territorial sea is
also described as “sovereignty” but, in fact, it is limited by the UNCLOS
requirement that such sovereignty be “exercised subject to this Convention
and to other rules of international law.”138 The most commonly mentioned
example is the long recognized right of foreign vessels to “innocent
passage” through this zone.139
Contiguous Zone: The next most seaward offshore area of jurisdiction
is known as the Contiguous Zone. It lies adjacent to the territorial sea
and extends up to 24 miles from the baseline. The coastal State is not
described as having “sovereignty” in this zone but “control” necessary to
prevent violations, and punish infringements, of specified laws in its
territory and territorial sea.140
Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”): The EEZ breaks the pattern of
ever more seaward adjacent maritime zones. Rather than beginning at
the seaward limit of the contiguous zone, it begins at the seaward limit
of the territorial sea and extends offshore up to a distance of 200 nautical
miles of the coast.141 Within this zone, the coastal State has rights—and
obligations—to preserve and manage natural resources of the sea and
seabed.142 Its rights to these resources are described as “sovereign”143
and it is given authority to enforce those rights.144
These “zones of maritime jurisdiction” produced new opportunities
for coastal States to expand their pollution control authority over foreign
flag vessels. Article 211 of UNCLOS added authority. First, it requires

137. That “baseline” is a composite of the mean low-water line along the open coast,
closings across the mouths of rivers, bays and ports which open on the sea, and artificial
baselines along deeply indented or island-bound mainlands as permitted by Article 7.
UNCLOS, supra note 59, arts. 7–11.
138. Id. art. 2(3).
139. Id. arts. 2(1), 17–26.
140. Id. art. 33. Those laws and regulations may involve customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitation.
141. Id. art. 55. The consequence here being that the contiguous zone is subsumed
within the EEZ.
142. Id. arts. 55–73.
143. Id. art. 73(1).
144. Id. art. 73.
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States to “establish international rules and standards to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from vessels.”145 In addition,
it requires that:
States shall adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution of the marine environment from vessels flying their flag or of
their registry. Such laws and regulations shall at least have the same effect as
that of generally accepted international rules and standards established through
the competent international organization or general diplomatic commerce.146

And finally:
States which establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of
foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters or for a call at their off-shore
terminals shall give due publicity to such requirements and shall communicate
them to the competent international organization.147

Nevertheless, writing nine years after the negotiation of UNCLOS,
Bodansky expressed concern that although Article 211 envisioned reexamination of international standards to better balance coastal and
maritime interests, little progress has yet been made, and “the question is
whether the balance set forth in UNCLOS III will be revised by unilateral
assertions of jurisdiction by coastal states, maximizing instability and
conflict, or through multilateral negotiations.”148 He concluded “[w]hat
needs to be done now is to balance . . . the competing interests of coastal
and maritime States, so that expansions of coastal state authority are
undertaken in an orderly manner with the least burden on navigation.”149
b. Special Areas of Maritime Jurisdiction—Article 234
Ice-Covered Areas
For some time, arctic States have expressed concern that areas of their
maritime jurisdiction, which are ice-covered for most of the year, may
be particularly vulnerable to vessel source pollution. Ice shelves have
145. Id. art. 211(1). As noted supra, many thought that international standards had
not kept up with pollution control technology.
146. Id. art. 211(2).
147. Id. art. 211(3).
148. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 777
149. Id. For example, as Bodansky points out, “Article 21 [of UNCLOS] permits
coastal states to adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction, and control of
pollution of their territorial sea. [21(1)(f)]. But under Article 211(4), these coastal state
prescriptions may not ‘hamper’ innocent passage. The problem, of course, is to determine
which coastal state laws and regulations would have that effect.” Id. at 764–65.
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kept the Arctic Ocean from serving as a reliable transit route around the
continents. However, with anticipation of global warming has come the
expectation that ice shelves may recede, making the arctic navigable for
portions of each year. Plans are underway to construct merchant vessels
capable of transiting a more hospitable arctic. The possibility of the route’s
commercial viability has prompted Canadian legal authorities to renew
their relatively ‘dormant’ claims that the ‘passage’ is composed of Canadian
‘internal’ water. This prompted the government to authorize the construction
of six patrol vessels to monitor its entrances year-round and allocate $720
million for a new polar class icebreaker.150
Great circle routes would greatly reduce the distance, and thereby the
cost, of transporting goods between Asia and Europe.151 The most likely
route is expected to be through the vast archipelago of Canadian islands,
which extend as much as 700 nautical miles north from the continental
mainland.
Canada began to consider means of asserting jurisdiction over such
vessel traffic as much as fifty years ago, when the United States tested
the route with the ice-breaking tanker “Manhattan”.152 Since that time,
Canada has put forward claims of “historic internal waters” and has drawn
baselines around the circumference of the archipelago. These lines were
originally described as the limits of historic internal waters—not UNCLOS
Article 7 “straight baselines.”153 The United States does not recognize
the waters of the archipelago as internal under either theory.154
However, UNCLOS Article 234 provides a third avenue by which
Canada may be able to protect its environmental interests in the arctic
without being accused of stretching Article 7’s treaty law of straight
baselines or the customary international requirements for historic internal
waters. Article 234 permits a coastal State to adopt marine pollution
control measures in portions of its EEZ that are ice-covered for most of
the year,155 creating exceptional hazards to navigation in an area in
which major harm to the environment could result.

150. TED L. MCDORMAN, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS: INTERNATIONAL OCEAN LAW
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 230–32 (2009).
151. It has been estimated that the Northwest Passage will shorten the existing
Panama Canal route by more than 5,000 statute miles. Id. at 231.
152. At the time, ice-breaking tankers were being considered as a means of transporting
petroleum from the North Slope out of Alaska. The Alaska pipeline was built instead.
153. MCDORMAN, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS, supra note 150, at 233–40.
154. American Embassy Ottawa Note No. 222 of June 24, 1985, State Department
File No. P85 0118 0711/0714, quoted in J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED
STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 345–46 (Shigeru Oda ed., 2d ed.
1996). For a thorough history and discussion of law of the sea relations between Canada
and the United States, see MCDORMAN, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS, supra note 150.
155. UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 234.
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Article 234 brings a new protective device to international law, which
was negotiated specifically in anticipation of future transit through the
Northwest Passage, and will likely be employed by Canada to protect the
waters of its arctic archipelago if and when that area becomes navigable
to commercial vessels.
As Professor Bodansky notes, “The [Canadian] conflict has now been
resolved by Article 234 . . . which specifically allows coastal states
to prescribe and enforce laws for the prevention, reduction, and control
of marine pollution from vessels in ice covered areas in their EEZ.”156
2. The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships—MARPOL
The IMO has recently taken significant steps toward controlling
atmospheric pollution from the world merchant fleet.
First, Annex VI of MARPOL has been amended to substantially reduce
nitrogen dioxide emissions worldwide. The requirements will be introduced
in two stages, applying to newly built engines in 2011 and generally
beginning in 2016. Long-term standards are expected to result in an
eighty percent reduction in nitrogen dioxides.157
Second, the IMO is processing coastal State requests that special
Emission Control Areas (“ECAs”) be authorized adjacent to designated
coastlines within which even more stringent nitrogen dioxide restrictions
may be imposed. One such ECA has been approved for much of the coasts
of Canada and the United States.
a. The United States/Canadian Emissions Control Area
A recent example may be evidence that Professor Bodansky’s preferred
“multilateral” approach to balancing environmental and maritime interests
is merely late in coming rather than being replaced by “unilateral”
assertions of jurisdiction. Our example is the designation of an ECA off
the coasts of the United States and Canada.
The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible
for, among other things, facilitating the development of standards to

156. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 772 n.274.
157. EPA Regulations implementing programs can be found at the electronic Code
of Federal Regulations at Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R §§ 94, 1042, 1043
(2008).
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control air emissions from ships. The International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL”) Annex VI is a United
Nations treaty administered by the IMO and pursuant to which the IMO
accomplishes its goals—including the establishment of global vessel
emission standards and even more restrictive standards where adjacent
coastal areas are suffering from acute environmental effects of vessel
emissions.
In 2004, the United States Commission on Ocean Policy recommended
that “[t]he United States should ratify MARPOL Annex VI and work for
International Maritime Organization (IMO) adoption of even stricter air
emission standards that reflect advances in marine engine technology,
availability of cleaner fuels, and improved operational practices.”158
Moreover, “[t]he U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . . . should use
Annex VI criteria and guidelines to evaluate U.S. ocean and coastal
areas with impaired air quality, and seek IMO designation of appropriate
areas as Sulfur Oxide Emission Control Areas.”159
Both of these recommendations are now in effect. New global standards
for marine diesel engines and fuels were adopted by IMO member States
in 2008 and went into effect in 2010. Even more stringent emission
standards were set out for specific coastal areas. Thereafter, the United
States and Canada sought, and received, authority to designate sulfur
oxide ECAs within which the more stringent standards would apply
along specified stretches of their coasts.160
The ECA extends 200 nautical miles seaward off the coasts of the
United States and Canada south of 60 degrees north latitude, including
the eight largest of the Hawaiian Islands.161
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) explains that to
comply with ECA restrictions, “ships operating in designated areas will be
required to use engines that meet the most advanced technology-forcing
standards for NOx emissions, and to use fuel with sulfur content at or
below” the prescribed standards.162 Those standards are: 15,000 ppm

158. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 244.
159. Id.
160. For a more complete history of the U.S. efforts to establish the ECA, see Hildreth
& Torbitt, supra note 2, at 364–65.
161. A separate ECA has been designated within 200 nautical miles of the French
islands of Miquelon and St. Pierre, off the coast of Newfoundland, extending the
environmental protection in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans from the U.S./Mexican
border to 60 degrees north, approximately the latitude of Anchorage, Alaska.
162. New Emission Control and Fuel Standards for Large Marine Engines, THE
MARITIME EXEC. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/new-emiss
ion-control-and-fuel-standards-large-marine-engines.
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prior to July 2010, 10,000 ppm from 2010 to 2015, and 1,000 ppm for
2015 forward.163
The EPA also reports that “[t]his most stringent ECA fuel standard is
expected to be met through fuel switching.”164 “In most cases, ships already
have the capability to store two or more fuels.”165 And “[a]s an alternative
to using low sulfur fuel, ship operators may choose to equip their vessels
with exhaust gas cleaning devices (“scrubbers”). In this case, the scrubber
extracts sulfur from the exhaust.”166
b. Coastal State Enforcement 200 Nautical Miles Offshore
The standards just described will become enforceable in August 2012.167
In contrast with the previously discussed “port control” authority,
conventional international law recognizes the right of coastal States to
enforce the internationally adopted standards of the IMO well seaward
of their national territories.
Article 220 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
entitled “Enforcement by coastal States,” paragraph 3, provides that:
Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the
exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the exclusive
economic zone, committed a violation of applicable international rules
and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels
or laws and regulations of that State conforming and giving effect to such rules
and standards, that State may require the vessel to give information regarding its
identity and port of registry, its last and its next port of call and other relevant
information required to establish whether a violation has occurred.168

Paragraph 5 of that Article further provides:
Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel . . . has . . .
committed . . . [such] a violation . . . resulting in a substantial discharge causing or
threatening significant pollution of the marine environment, that State may
undertake physical inspection of the vessel . . . if the vessel has refused to give
information or if the information supplied . . . is manifestly at variance with the
evident factual situation . . .169

163. EPA Designation 2010, supra note 25, at 4. The final standard is that required
by the European Union since 2010. Hildreth & Torbitt, supra note 2, at 365.
164. EPA Designation 2010, supra note 25, at 4
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Hildreth & Torbitt, supra note 2, at 365.
168. UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 220(3).
169. UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 220(5).
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And Paragraph 6 concludes that where such violation resulted “in a
discharge causing major damage or threat of major damage to the coastline
or related interests of the coastal State . . . that State may . . . institute
proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance with its
laws.”170
Article 220 represents a major development in the international law of
the sea and the continuing effort to balance the protection of coastal
States’ environmental interests and the merchant mariners’ traditional
right to freedom of navigation.171
It has now been 20 years since Professor Bodansky, and others, expressed
concern that maritime States might not have been acting in good faith in
the IMO process of setting international pollution standards; suggesting
that their motivation may have been “a desire . . . to forestall unilateral
coastal state regulation.”172 In the meantime, coastal States and
environmental interests have played a larger part in IMO determinations,
and it would now appear that international practice is following the
approach set out in conventional international law.
IV. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THESE REDUCTIONS IN
VESSEL SOURCE POLLUTION
Costs and benefits of the foregoing anti-pollution programs have been
estimated by a number of measures. In the most general terms, the
EPA predicts that:
The U.S. coastline and much of the interior of the country will experience
significant improvements in air quality due to reduced PM [particulate matter]
and ozone from ships complying with ECA standards. Coastal areas will
experience the largest improvements; however, significant improvements will
extend hundreds of miles inland to reach nonattainment areas in states such as
Nevada, Tennessee and Pennsylvania. National treasures such as the Grand
Canyon National Park and the Great Smoky Mountains will also see air quality
improvements.173

Although expensive, the EPA believes that “[t]he costs of implementing
and complying with the ECA are expected to be small in comparison to
the health and welfare benefits and on par with the costs of achieving
similar emissions reductions through additional controls on land-based

170. UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 220(6) (permitting interference with freedom of
passage only in the most extreme circumstances).
171. UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 57 (“The exclusive economic zone shall not extend
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.”). The United States asserted its claim to such a zone by Presidential
Proclamation. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983).
172. Bodansky, supra note 27, at 726.
173. EPA Designation 2010, supra note 25, at 5.
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sources.”174 Those costs to the merchant vessel industry, between 2010
and 2020, have been estimated at $3.2 billion—increasing the costs on a
route that includes 1,700 nautical miles in the ECA by about 3%, or $18
per 20 foot container.175
On the other hand, the EPA estimates that these programs will bring
substantial benefits in public health, with significant monetized savings.
Annual benefits in 2020 are predicted to include the prevention of
between 5,500 to 14,000 premature deaths, 3,800 fewer emergency room
visits, and 4,900,000 fewer cases of acute respiratory symptoms.176
Combined, these would result in “monetized health benefits in 2020 in
the U.S.” of $47–$110 billion.177
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also considered costs and benefits
in its review of the State of California’s program to condition port entry
on compliance with vessel fuel standards.178 It is fair to conclude, as the
EPA and Court of Appeals seem to have suggested, that health and global
warming benefits to be gained from these State and federal programs
significantly outweigh the additional monetary costs to shippers and
eventual consumers.
V. COMPATIBILITY OF PORT AND COASTAL STATE PROGRAMS
It might appear from the distinct differences between these State and
federal environmental programs that compliance with both could impose
substantial burdens, and costs, on merchant vessels bound for California
ports. In upholding the State regulations, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals looked carefully at that question and concluded that such
consequences were unlikely.
First, the Court noted that the only substantive difference between the
two programs is that the ultimate State standards would become effective in
2012, three years prior to the final federal standards.179 Congress had
acknowledged this difference in enacting legislation for the federal program,
174. Id. at 4.
175. Id. at 4–5; see also Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 659 F. 3d at 1159 (9th Cir.
2011) (showing that others have projected that this additional cost is equivalent to a 12.5
cent increase in the price of an Asian television set sold in the United States.); Hildreth
& Torbitt, supra note 2, at 366.
176. EPA Designation 2010, supra note 25, at 5
177. Id.
178. See Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F. 3d at 1154, 1159–60, 1175–76 (9th
Cir. 2011).
179. See id. at 1158–59, 1161.
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and specifically provided that the more stringent State provisions would
not be superseded.180
The California rules are similarly accommodating. They include a
specific “sunset” clause, which provides for “their termination when
CARB’s Executive Officer makes a finding that the federal government
has adopted and is enforcing requirements that will achieve equivalent
emission reductions.”181
Clearly, both sovereigns intended the outcome reached by the Ninth
Circuit. More stringent state standards will remain until the equivalent
federal standards come into effect.
Second, it might have been argued that, although California and the
federal government had assured that their programs would not present
merchant seamen with inconsistent requirements, sister states might adopt
such legislation. The appellate court short-circuited such a contention by
pointing out that “it appears that no other state in the Union has adopted,
or is likely to adopt before the full implementation of the ECA [federal
program], any ‘competing or conflicting’ fuel use requirements.”182
Third, the standard international concern is that port State control will
interfere with traditional freedoms of navigation. Yet the trial court
emphasized, and the Court of Appeals noted, that:
PMSA [plaintiff/appellant] presented no evidence indicating that the Vessel Fuel
Rules impeded commerce or navigation, observing in particular that: (1) PMSA
admitted that compliance is not technically impossible or even especially difficult;
[and] (2) PMSA failed to show that the required fuel is unavailable or otherwise
would adversely affect ship operations.183

Fourth, there is no doubt that the cost of complying with the proposed
rules is substantial, estimated to be $30,000 per vessel call at a California
port.184 Put in perspective, however, as the court did:
[A]ny increased cost . . . would appear to be relatively small in comparison with
the overall cost of a trans-Pacific voyage (representing less than 1% of the cost
of a typical trans-Pacific voyage and approximately a $6.00 increase per 20-foot
shipping container) as well as the increased costs eventually passed on to the

180. “Authorities, requirements, and remedies of this chapter supplement and neither
amend nor repeal any other authorities, requirements, or remedies conferred by any other
provision of law. Nothing in this chapter shall limit, deny, amend, modify, or repeal any other
authority, requirement, or remedy available to the United States, or any person, except as
expressly provided in this chapter.” 33 U.S.C. § 1911 (2008); see also Pac. Merch. Shipping
Ass’n, 659 F.3d at 1180 (9th Cir. 2011).
181. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 659 F.3d at 1159 (9th Cir. 2011).
182. Id. at 1181.
183. Id. at 1176.
184. Id.
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ultimate consumer (amounting, for instance, to an extra 12.5 cents in the cost of
a plasma TV).185

Finally, the Court of Appeals contrasted these “costs” of the California
program to the State’s “especially powerful interest in controlling the
harmful effects of air pollution resulting from the fuel used by oceangoing vessels while they are within 24 miles of the state’s coast.”186 As
mentioned at the outset, California has made great strides in reducing
atmospheric pollution from onshore sources—both stationary and mobile.
Despite those efforts, the State will apparently be unable to comply with
national air quality standards by the 2014 deadline without this control
of merchant vessel emissions.187
The federal and State programs are compatible.188
VI. CONCLUSION
Vessel source atmospheric pollution remains a significant health and
climate change problem. Historically, “flags of convenience” have been
accused of exacerbating the problem by failing to enforce existing
international emission standards and standing in the way of even stricter
standards. Some international authorities have expressed concern that
States, suffering adverse environmental effects as a result, might turn to
unilateral assertions of jurisdiction over vessels sailing under foreign
flags—thereby undermining the stable regime of the oceans envisioned
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.189
Our review of two new American programs to reduce such pollution
indicates that protection is provided without unreasonably imposing on
long-standing freedoms of navigation.
The California program of “Port State” control is grounded on the
traditional international right of a port State to condition entry into its
internal waters. Prohibited acts occur within the port and enforcement
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1180–81.
187. Id. at 1181 n.8.
188. In June 2011, appellant Pacific Merchant Shipping Association petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari—asking that the Court review the
judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
189. For example, Professor Bodansky expressed concern that “[u]nless maritime
states display greater willingness to agree to international measures that address the concerns
of coastal states, the likelihood will grow that coastal states will develop their own
standards or assert jurisdiction beyond what is allowed by UNCLOS III.” Bodansky, supra
note 27, at 771–72.
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occurs there. Vessels have no freedom of navigation in foreign ports. If
they choose to enter a port, they subject themselves to the port State’s
jurisdiction.
The federal Emission Control Area is based upon entirely different
authority. It regulates emissions within 200 nautical miles of the United
States’ coast, but not through a unilateral assertion of jurisdiction. Rather,
both the jurisdiction and standards to be enforced are established through
international treaty. Through that process worldwide, international vessel
emission standards have been significantly tightened, and endangered
coastal States can petition an international body for authorization to
enforce even stricter standards in designated maritime zones adjacent to
their coasts. International law still protects navigational rights to innocent
passage.
Although long in coming, it would appear that the Law of the Sea has
achieved a workable balance between the interests of maritime States
(freedom of navigation) and coastal States (environmental protection).
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